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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, college campuses have served as forums for war pro-
tests,1 academic experimentation,2 and the free exchange of ideas.3 Al-
though demonstrations like those in the 1960s do not seem to be the pri-
mary method of political protest among students anymore, college cam-
puses are inherently politically charged places used for the expression of 
many diverse opinions—nearly all American colleges host student politi-
cal groups or issue-based groups that seek to bring awareness to a partic-
ular cause. When protests do happen, students sometimes get violent or 
the situation becomes chaotic, resulting in sit-ins, class disruptions, se-
vere tensions between students and administrators, and even student ar-
rests.4 Despite these sometimes negative results, colleges and universities 
are well-aware that learning depends on the free exchange of ideas.5 In 
fact, the learning environment that colleges seek to maintain depends on 
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 1. See generally THE VIETNAM WAR ON CAMPUS: OTHER VOICES, MORE DISTANT DRUMS 
(Marc Gilbert ed., 2000) (examining Vietnam protests on college campuses in the South and Mid-
west). 
 2. Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U.L. 791, 801 
(2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Ben Margot, Students Across USA Protest Over College Funding, Tuition, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-03-04-university-protests_N.htm. 
 5. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CAMPUS FREE SPEECH, STUDENTS AND FACULTY SPEAK OUT ON THE 
FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, CAMPUS VOICES 2 
(2006), http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/lzljnMNJ0TECSbbAIlmThA/campus_voices.pdf. 
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the freedom to speak about controversial issues and the freedom to hear 
differing opinions.6 
For these reasons, colleges and universities are unique public spac-
es. They are devoted to creating an atmosphere conducive to learning, 
thereby ensuring a quality education.7 Colleges create this atmosphere 
through methods such as tenure,8 protecting freedom of speech and as-
sembly on portions of their campuses,9 and establishing “gun-free zones” 
so students feel safe to express themselves.10 Unlike public parks, for 
example, colleges and universities have not traditionally been open to the 
public, and they provide more than just opportunities for recreation. Ra-
ther, colleges have an interest in seeing their students well-educated, 
enabling them to become functioning members of our society.11 
A good education requires students and faculty to feel safe and 
comfortable when expressing their ideas or making mistakes in the class-
room. In order to provide this safe academic learning environment, the 
vast majority of colleges prohibit carrying or possessing guns on their 
campuses.12 The learning environment could be severely compromised if 
students or faculty were potentially carrying a firearm because some in-
dividuals may feel threatened or intimidated, which could very well inhi-
bit their ability to learn.13 
The notion that universities should provide an environment where 
students and faculty feel safe enough to freely exchange ideas has been 
advocated for in the context of the First Amendment. For example, in 
response to Yale University Press’s decision to remove images of Mo-
hammed from a scholarly text, several academic and free-speech groups 
                                                 
 6. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 3 (2006), http://www.aaup.org/ 
NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B33033D34A51B534CEE0C7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrinciplesonAcade
micFreedomandTenure.pdf. 
 7. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957). 
 8. Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in COMMISSION ON 
ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 114–16 (1973). 
 9. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis 
for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 481 
(2005). 
 10. See, e.g., Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (D. Utah 2003) (The uni-
versity asserted that the purpose of its gun-free policy included the preservation of the educational 
process.). 
 11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003); see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is 
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.”). 
 12. See Derek P. Langhauser, Gun Regulation of Campus: Understanding Heller and Prepar-
ing for Subsequent Litigation and Legislation, 36 J.C. & U.L. 63, 63 (2009). 
 13. Kathy L. Wyer, A Most Dangerous Experiment? University Autonomy, Academic Freedom, 
and the Concealed-Weapons Controversy at the University of Utah, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 983, 1016 
(2003). 
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urged higher-education institutions to “stand up for certain basic prin-
ciples: that the free exchange of ideas is essential to liberal democracy; 
that each person is entitled to hold and express his or her own views 
without fear of bodily harm . . . .”14 These principles should also be 
upheld within the context of deciding how guns should be regulated on 
college campuses. 
Finally, implicit in the concept of the academic freedom doctrine is 
the notion that colleges and universities require autonomy and should 
have the power to dictate policy choices on their campuses.15 For exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “the essentiality of free-
dom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident . . . . To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.”16 It 
follows then that the academic freedom doctrine necessarily “restricts the 
scope of permissible legislative interference with public [colleges and] 
universities.”17  
Traditionally, regulating firearms has been under the authority of 
the states.18 But two recent judicial opinions have changed Second 
Amendment jurisprudence and may affect how public colleges and uni-
versities regulate guns on their campuses. In District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, the Supreme Court settled the debate as to whether the Second 
Amendment was a collective right related solely to state militia service, 
or whether it provided an individual right to keep and bear arms.19 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that individual self-defense is “the central com-
ponent” of the Second Amendment,20 and law-abiding citizens must be 
permitted “to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”21 In dicta, how-
ever, the majority stated that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited,”22 and it expressed support for tra-
                                                 
 14. Peter Schmidt, Colleges are Urged to Defend Free Speech, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., 
Nov. 30, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Urged-to-Defend-Free/49297/. Yale University 
Press refused to publish the illustrations because it feared publication would trigger violence. Id. In 
response, academic and free-speech groups released a joint statement calling on colleges and univer-
sities to stand up for free expression. Id. 
 15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265–66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that the First Amendment created a right of academic freedom). 
 16. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. 
 17. Wyer, supra note 13, at 1013. Part of the concern about legislative interference stems from 
the fact that a state may pass a statute that supersedes a college or university regulation. See discus-
sion infra Part II.A. 
 18. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3125 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
private gun regulation is the quintessential exercise of a state’s police power). 
 19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 635. 
 22. Id. at 626. 
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ditional exercises of police power, including, but not limited to, “the pos-
session of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings . . . .”23 
Two years later, in McDonald v. Chicago, the Court incorporated 
the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 The 
Court reiterated its assurance that “longstanding regulatory measures” 
such as the prohibition of firearms in sensitive places would not be impe-
riled by either its holding in Heller or its incorporation of the Second 
Amendment.25 But several questions remain. Do prohibitions of guns on 
college campuses infringe on a fundamental right? What standard of re-
view should lower courts use when evaluating gun regulations? What 
types of regulations can survive? What should colleges do to maintain 
authority over their campuses? Because incorporation may imply that the 
right is fundamental, McDonald poses a legitimate threat to a public col-
lege’s interest in prohibiting firearms on campus. 
This Comment will argue that because McDonald’s holding limits 
the right under the Second Amendment to protect individuals using guns 
in defense of “hearth and home,” public colleges and universities are 
constitutionally permitted to continue prohibiting guns on their campus-
es. And although the Court did not explicitly state the standard of review 
that should apply when determining whether a regulation unconstitution-
ally infringes on the right to keep and bear arms,26 this Comment will 
argue that prohibition of guns on campuses and even in residence halls 
should survive strict scrutiny because the policy is narrowly tailored to 
achieve compelling interests in academic freedom and public safety.   
Part II summarizes Heller, McDonald, and incorporation against the 
states, in general. Part III discusses recent lobbying efforts and explains 
how the McDonald case implicates public colleges and universities. Last-
ly, in Part IV, I argue that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard of 
review, but even if the courts use strict scrutiny, gun-free zones on public 
college campuses should be held constitutional. 
                                                 
 23. Id. 
 24. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 25. Id. at 3047. 
 26. In Heller, the Court did appear to foreclose rational basis as the appropriate standard of 
review when it stated that banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to use for 
self-defense would fail constitutional muster under any of the standards of scrutiny applied to enu-
merated constitutional rights. 554 U.S. at 628–29. In a footnote, the Court briefly elaborated on its 
standard of review discussion, stating, “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and 
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate consti-
tutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. at 628 n.27. Accordingly, this 
Comment does not address whether a gun-free zone would survive rational basis review. 
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II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO 
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF HEARTH AND HOME 
In this Part, I will summarize the holding in Heller and highlight 
some of the dicta that have left lower courts with more questions than 
guidance on the Second Amendment. Then I will briefly discuss the in-
corporation doctrine, the majority opinion in McDonald, and their impli-
cation on state regulation of firearms.  
A. District of Columbia v. Heller 
In spite of the Supreme Court’s previous jurisprudence on the 
Second Amendment,27 the majority in Heller found that the Second 
Amendment was an individual right rather than a collective right depen-
dent upon service in a well-regulated militia.28 The Court held that even 
if the purpose of codifying the Second Amendment was to preserve the 
state militia, individual self-defense was nevertheless the “central com-
ponent” of the right.29 In Heller, the gun-control regulation at issue was 
the essential prohibition of handguns within the District of Columbia.30 
The District made it a crime to carry any unregistered firearm and re-
fused to register any handguns thereby making them unlawful.31 The sta-
tute further required all lawfully registered firearms to be either unloaded 
or bound by a trigger lock.32 The Court reasoned that the D.C. regulation 
                                                 
 27. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence 
tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in 
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such 
an instrument.”); see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (repeating its holding from 
United States v. Cruikshank—the Second Amendment is “one of the amendments that has no other 
effect than to restrict the powers of the national government”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542, 553 (1875) (“[Bearing arms for a lawful purpose] is not a right granted by the Constitution. 
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amend-
ment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be in-
fringed by Congress.”). 
 28. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591–92. 
 29. Id. at 599. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss whether the majority’s inter-
pretation of the historical record was flawed. See id. at 639–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the holding in Miller—which declared that the Second Amendment protects only the right to keep 
and bear arms for certain military purposes and does not diminish the power of Congress to regulate 
the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is “both the most natural reading of the Amend-
ment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption”); see also Patrick J. 
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding 
of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18 (2010); Saul Cornell, 
Originialism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 
(2008). Although numerous articles have been written on the debate, this Comment accepts the 
majority opinion for what it now is—the law of the land. 
 30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574.  
 31. Id. at 574–75. 
 32. Id. at 575. 
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prohibited from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to 
keep and use for protection” and therefore failed strict scrutiny.33 Accor-
dingly, it held that a total ban on the possession of handguns in the home 
unconstitutionally infringed on the right of a law-abiding individual to 
keep and bear arms for self-defense.34  
The Heller Court declined to specify the standard of review lower 
courts should use when determining whether a gun regulation impermiss-
ibly infringes on an individual’s Second Amendment right. In dicta, 
however, the majority stated that the right is “not a right to keep and car-
ry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.”35 Furthermore, the Court stated that “nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the com-
mercial sale of arms.”36 The Court even went so far as to identify these 
regulatory measures—now known as the Heller Safe Harbor—as exam-
ples of presumptively lawful regulations, the list of which is not exhaus-
tive.37 
Despite these reassurances, the majority opinion responded to Jus-
tice Breyer’s dissent in which he discusses the standard of review courts 
should use when deciding whether a gun regulation meets constitutional 
muster.38 Justice Breyer proposed a case-by-case interest-balancing ap-
proach that would differ from the traditionally expressed levels of strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.39 In response, 
the majority stated, “We know of no other enumerated constitutional 
right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘inter-
est-balancing’ approach.”40 The Court then used the First Amendment as 
an example to illustrate its point: 
[T]he freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people rati-
fied . . . included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of 
state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and 
                                                 
 33. Id. at 628–29. 
 34. Id. at 635. 
 35. Id. at 626. 
 36. Id. at 626–27. 
 37. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 38. Id. at 634. 
 39. Id. These traditional standards of review are also used to evaluate whether state laws vi-
olate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect 
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135–37 (2011). 
 40. Id. But see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2010) (arguing that modern First Amendment doctrine leans 
heavily toward balancing tests rather than the categorical approach adopted in Heller). 
2011] The Second Amendment Goes to College 241 
wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like 
the First, it is the very product of an interest-balancing by the 
people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew. 
And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates 
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citi-
zens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.41 
On one hand, this dictum might be helpful to those who wish to 
analogize the Second Amendment to the First when arguing for a par-
ticular standard of review. On the other, it may suggest that the right to 
keep and bear arms in self-defense of the home is absolute, meaning 
there would be no compelling government interest that could ever out-
weigh it. If the right is absolute, public colleges and universities would 
encounter significant difficulties in arguing the constitutionality of pro-
hibiting the possession of guns in their residence halls. 
B. Incorporation Doctrine 
Because the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government,42 
much of the scholarship written after the Heller decision came down re-
volved around whether the Court would next incorporate the Second 
Amendment against the states.43 
The theory that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in-
corporated the Bill of Rights in its entirety has never been embraced.44 In 
United States v. Cruikshank, the Court held that the Second Amendment 
“shall not be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not 
be infringed by Congress.”45 Two subsequent cases, Presser v. Illinois 
and Miller v. Texas, “reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies 
only to the Federal Government.”46 These three cases, however, were 
decided before the Court began the process of “selective incorpora-
tion.”47 Through this process, the Court began to hold that particular 
                                                 
 41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 42. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 26 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (“[T]he Constitution was ordained 
and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not 
for the government of the individual states.”). 
 43. See generally Ben Howell, Come and Take It: The Status of Texas Handgun Regulation 
After District of Columbia v. Heller, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (2009); Nelson Lund, Anticipating 
Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role of Inferior Courts, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 185 (2008). 
 44. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 (2010); see, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78, 99–91 (1908) (holding that neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Due 
Process Clause protects the right against self-incrimination from state action); Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not protect the grand jury in-
dictment requirement). 
 45. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). 
 46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620. 
 47. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031. 
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rights contained in the first eight amendments applied to the states under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In order to de-
termine whether a right should be incorporated against the states, the 
Court has recognized that due process protects “rights that are the very 
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and essential to a fair and enligh-
tened system of justice.”49 Accordingly, First Amendment rights such as 
the freedom of religion,50 the freedom of assembly,51 and the freedom of 
the press52 have all been incorporated against the states. The warrant re-
quirement,53 the exclusionary rule,54 and the freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment55 have also been in-
corporated. When the Court finds that the Due Process Clause protects an 
individual right, incorporation safeguards that right from impermissible 
infringement by state action, including action undertaken by public col-
leges and universities. 
C. McDonald v. Chicago   
Until 2010, the Second Amendment was on the short list of rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights that were not incorporated against the 
states. Heller held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep 
and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, but it did not 
address the issue of incorporation. 
The majority in McDonald found that in order for the right recog-
nized in Heller to apply against the states, the right must be “fundamen-
tal to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”56 The Court cites its historical analysis from Hel-
                                                 
 48. Id. at 3034; see, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936) (holding that freedom 
of assembly falls under the protection of the Due Process Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
53 (1932) (holding that assistance of counsel in capital cases is protected under the Due Process 
Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that freedom of speech and press 
fall under the protection of the Due Process Clause). 
 49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 148 (1968) (stating that the test for incorporation is “whether a right is among those fundamen-
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”). 
 50. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment 
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
 51. De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364. 
 52. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
 53. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964). 
 54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 55. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
 56. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). There has been some debate as to 
whether the McDonald opinion distorted the incorporation test. See id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that “inclusion in the Bill of Rights is neither necessary nor sufficient for an interest to 
be judicially enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment”). Once again, however, it is beyond the 
scope of this Comment to engage in whether McDonald was decided correctly. Instead, I focus on 
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ler to show that the Second Amendment was deeply rooted in our coun-
try’s history and tradition. The English Bill of Rights protected keeping 
arms for self-defense; during the ratification of the United States Bill of 
Rights, there was a fear that the federal government would disarm the 
people; and in the 1850s, when the perceived threat of militia disarma-
ment faded, the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense was highly 
valued.57 The Court further argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
“aimed to protect the constitutional right to bear arms and not simply to 
prohibit discrimination.”58 Based on this analysis, the Court found that 
“the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a 
prohibition that could be ignored so long as the State legislated in an 
evenhanded manner.”59 Taking all of this historical evidence into consid-
eration, the McDonald Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right rec-
ognized in Heller.”60 
In dicta, the Court again offered reassurances. Even though the 
Second Amendment is fully binding on the States and “limits their ability 
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,” 
their ability to experiment with reasonable gun regulations has not been 
eliminated and will continue under the Second Amendment.61 Addition-
ally, the Court recognized that neither its holding in Heller nor its hold-
ing in McDonald should “cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory 
measures as . . . forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings.”62 
Finally, the Court once again did not explicitly state what standard 
of review lower courts should use when state and local gun regulations 
are inevitably challenged. The McDonald decision essentially states that 
the Second Amendment is fundamental enough to be incorporated 
against the States. Even though the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the liberty interest to keep and bear arms for self-
defense in one’s home, that does not necessarily mean the interest pro-
tected is a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny. And the analysis 
for constitutionality depends on whether McDonald incorporated only a 
                                                                                                             
how the holding may affect regulating guns on college campuses regardless of whether the opinion 
was flawed. 
 57. Id. at 3036–38. 
 58. Id. at 3040–41. 
 59. Id. at 3043–44. 
 60. Id. at 3050. 
 61. Id. at 3046. 
 62. Id. at 3047. 
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liberty interest or a fundamental right, the latter of which would warrant 
heightened scrutiny.63 
Because most of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated 
against the states are considered fundamental rights,64 local governments 
would be well-advised to assume that the highest level of review would 
apply and consider whether their current or proposed regulations would 
survive strict scrutiny. In particular, public colleges and universities will 
need to evaluate how the incorporation of the Second Amendment affects 
their authority to enforce gun-free zones on campus. 
III. PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES’ AUTHORITY TO 
REGULATE GUNS ON THEIR CAMPUSES 
 
In this Part, I will explain the relationship between state legislatures 
and public colleges in reference to rulemaking authority. Then I will 
briefly discuss recent lobbying efforts that either support or oppose the 
carrying of firearms by concealed-carry permit holders on college cam-
puses. I will also summarize the current trends of regulating guns on 
campuses—most colleges and universities have enacted total prohibi-
tions. And finally, I will argue that state statutes allowing concealed 
weapons on campus threaten the ability of colleges and universities to 
make important policy decisions about the learning environment of their 
institutions. 
A. A College’s Authority to Promulgate Rules 
Pursuant to statutory enactments by state legislatures, public col-
leges and universities have the authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions concerning the conduct of their students, faculty, staff, and visi-
tors.65 The overwhelming majority of college boards support total bans 
on guns and wish to maintain institutional autonomy to implement poli-
cies beneficial to the learning environment in higher education.66 And 
                                                 
 63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that assisted suicide is not a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and therefore, rational basis re-
view applies). 
 64. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the freedom of 
speech and the freedom of the press under the First Amendment are fundamental rights). 
 65. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-3-103 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.50.140(7) 
(2010). 
 66. See Langhauser, supra note 12, at 96; see also THOMAS L. HARNISCH, AM. ASS’N OF 
STATE COLLEGES & UNIVS., CONCEALED WEAPONS ON STATE COLLEGE CAMPUSES: IN PURSUIT 
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 1 (2008), http://www.aascu.org/media/pm/pdf/ 
pmdec08.pdf. For example, University of Arizona President Robert Shelton explained his stance on 
S.B. 1467, a bill that if passed would allow the concealed carry of weapons on Arizona college cam-
puses: 
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with the exception of Utah, public colleges in every state have the statu-
tory authority to prohibit or restrict firearms on their campuses.67 Twen-
ty-six states have either a statute or regulation that explicitly prohibits the 
possession of guns in colleges and universities.68 Currently, there are 
twenty-five two- and four-year public colleges that allow concealed 
weapons to be carried on at least some portions of campus.69 All twenty-
five of these schools are located in Colorado, Michigan, Utah, and Vir-
ginia.70 
The scope of these gun regulations varies. For example, in 2004, 
Utah’s legislature passed a law that prohibited state and local entities 
from enacting or enforcing any ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy that 
in “any way inhibits or restricts the possession or use of firearms on ei-
ther public or private property.”71 The university board felt so strongly 
about its authority to regulate its colleges that it fought all the way up to 
the state supreme court.72 However, the court did not reach the issue of 
whether the university’s claim of academic freedom under the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution allowed it to exclude guns from 
campus in order to protect the free exchange of ideas.73 Although that 
issue was to be litigated in federal court, the university agreed to settle in 
                                                                                                             
The danger posed by guns is real, and well-documented. Bringing guns into classrooms 
simply increases the threat to those on campus. Universities provide a unique environ-
ment that is dependent on open and vigorous debate. Introducing guns into classrooms 
would dramatically and negatively impact the ability to engage in the exchange of ideas. 
Instead, we would see the intimidation inherent when guns are present—something that is 
antithetical to the very idea of a university. 
Becky Pallack, UA President Rejects the Idea of Gun-Toting Students, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 28, 
2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/blogs/campus-correspondent/article_79fe66ac-4368-11e0-9309-001 
cc4c002e0.html. 
 67. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, GUNS IN SCHOOLS 15 (2010), http://www.lcav. 
org/content/Guns_in_Schools.pdf. 
 68. HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 2–3. 
 69. ARMED CAMPUSES, http://www.armedcampuses.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) (providing 
the names of the twenty-five colleges and universities that allow concealed guns on campus). 
 70. Id. 
 71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (West 2008). 
 72. See Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006). For many years, the University 
of Utah had banned students, faculty, and staff from carrying firearms on its college campuses. Id. at 
1111. After the state legislature passed a statute that prohibited the university from enforcing its 
policy, the university sued for a declaration that the state constitution guaranteed it institutional 
autonomy, which would allow it to continue its enforcement of the firearm prohibition. Id. at 1112. 
But the court held that the state legislature had plenary authority to regulate public colleges and 
universities, and because the state constitution did not have a provision that stated otherwise, the 
university did not have the authority to disregard legislative enactments. Id. at 1119. 
 73. Id. at 1121. 
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return for a statutory amendment that allowed students living in dorm 
rooms to opt out of rooming with a student in possession of a firearm.74 
Utah, however, represents an extreme reduction in institutional au-
tonomy—no other state legislature has prohibited its public colleges and 
universities from adopting gun-control policies on their campuses.75 And 
while most colleges declare their campuses gun-free zones, a select few 
have begun to relax the rules for concealed-carry permit holders. For ex-
ample, Michigan State University allows permit holders to carry con-
cealed weapons on campus, but possession of guns in university build-
ings, including residence halls, is still prohibited.76 In general, Blue 
Ridge Community College prohibits firearms but allows permit holders 
to carry guns on its campus.77 
B. Lobbying the Legislature 
Significant lobbying efforts to allow concealed weapons on college 
campuses were underway long before the Supreme Court decided 
McDonald. For example, shortly after the 2007 massacre at Virginia 
Tech, during which an armed gunman killed thirty-two people before 
killing himself,78 a college student from the University of North Texas 
founded the nonprofit organization Students for Concealed Carry on 
Campus (SCCC).79 
One of the organization’s primary functions is to push state legisla-
tors and college administrators into allowing those individuals with a 
state-issued concealed-carry permit to bring their weapons onto public 
college campuses.80 SCCC has also begun litigating this issue in Colora-
do.81 In Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, Inc. v. Regents of the 
University of Colorado, the organization challenged the university’s pro-
hibition of guns on campus under the state constitution.82 While the court 
                                                 
 74. David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
515, 529 (2009). The first compromise university administrators proposed—a ban on concealed 
firearms from sports arenas, faculty offices, residence halls, and classrooms—was rejected. Gwen-
dolyn Bradley, Universities Permitted Only Dorm-Room Restrictions, ACADEME, Mar.-Apr. 2007, 
available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2007/MA/NB/Gun.htm. 
 75. HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 2. 
 76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425o(h) (2009). 
 77. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (West 2011). 
 78. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in 
U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/16/AR2007041600533.html. 
 79. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, http://www.concealedcampus.org (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2011). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Students for Concealed Carry on Campus v. Univ. of Colo., No. 09CA1230, 2010 WL 
1492308 (Colo. App. Apr. 15, 2010). 
 82. Id. at *1. 
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expressed no opinion on the merits of the case, the plaintiffs survived a 
motion to dismiss on a single narrow issue: the inability to carry a fire-
arm in a vehicle while traveling on or through a University of Colorado 
campus may infringe on the plaintiffs’ right to bear arms in self-
defense.83 Even without a decision on the merits or under the U.S. Con-
stitution, this case is instructive in that the court held that the claim for 
relief was not broad enough to include the prohibition of carrying guns 
on campus or in college buildings.84 
In contrast to SCCC, surviving victims of the Virginia Tech trage-
dy, as well as the families of those who died, founded a nonprofit organi-
zation called Students for Gun Free Schools.85 The mission of this organ-
ization is to oppose the efforts to allow concealed firearms to be carried 
on college campuses.86 Thus, for several years now, the issue of whether 
gun-free zones on college campuses reflects the best policy for protecting 
students, faculty, and staff has been percolating. The question now is 
how McDonald v. Chicago affects the debate. 
C. Current State Statutes 
Prior to McDonald, the greatest threat to a public college’s authori-
ty to regulate firearms on its campus stemmed from the passage of a state 
statute superseding a college regulation; only three states, however, have 
enacted statutes that either explicitly permit guns on college property or 
explicitly prohibit colleges from promulgating certain types of regula-
tions.87 For example, in Minnesota and Oklahoma, public colleges and 
universities may not prohibit the lawful carrying of firearms in parking 
lots.88 Oklahoma also allows a college or university president to consent 
to “campus-carry” in individual circumstances.89 As described previous-
ly, Utah has the most lenient policy, allowing anyone to carry a firearm 
anywhere.90 
                                                 
 83. Id. at *11. 
 84. The university appealed the decision to the Colorado State Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari on October 18, 2010. Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, No. 
10SC344, 2010 WL 4159242, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 18, 2010). The issues up on appeal are (1) whether 
the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of Regents’ authority to enact safety and welfare 
regulations, and (2) whether the standard of review for a constitutional challenge requires a less 
deferential standard than rational basis. Id. 
 85. STUDENTS FOR GUN FREE SCHOOLS, http://www.studentsforgunfreeschools.org (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2011). 
 86. Id. 
 87. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 67, at 15. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (West 2008). 
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By allowing concealed weapons on college campuses, these statutes 
carve out an exception to gun-free zones that threatens the institution’s 
academic freedom and the safety of students, faculty, and staff. Now that 
the Supreme Court has incorporated the Second Amendment against the 
states, legislatures may be persuaded to amend existing gun regulations, 
including total prohibitions of firearms on campuses. 
IV. MOVING TOWARD A STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Part IV, I will argue that public colleges and universities should 
fall within the Heller Safe Harbor exception, which presumes constitu-
tional any laws that prohibit carrying firearms in “sensitive places.”91 But 
even if a college campus does not fall within this exception, regulations 
banning guns on campus should still survive judicial review. In this Part, 
I will argue that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard of review 
courts use to determine whether a state or local regulation impermissibly 
infringes on the Second Amendment. Finally, I will analyze whether 
prohibitions of guns on campus and in residence halls can pass constitu-
tional muster under strict scrutiny. 
A. Heller’s Safe Harbor 
Before addressing the standards of review, this Comment seeks to 
determine whether a college or university fits into the exception enume-
rated in Heller, which presumes constitutional “laws forbidding the car-
rying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings.”92 Although the broad definition of “school” technically in-
cludes institutions of higher education, Black’s Law Dictionary has de-
fined the term as “[a]n institution of learning and education, esp. for 
children. When used in a statute or other contract, ‘school’ usually does 
not include universities, business colleges, or other institutions of higher 
education unless the intent to include such institutions is clearly indi-
cated.”93 Additionally, the term has generally been defined in statutes 
and state constitutions as referring only to common schools, grades K–
12.94 Consequently, it would be difficult to argue that the Supreme Court 
implicitly included colleges and universities within its definition of 
“schools.” 
The stronger argument is that public college and university cam-
puses are within the definition of a “sensitive place,” and therefore, gun-
free zones are presumptively constitutional. Although decided before 
                                                 
 91. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 93. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 94. Id. 
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McDonald, in Nordyke v. King (Nordyke IV), the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states,95 and then it 
went on analyze whether a city ordinance that made “it a misdemeanor to 
bring onto or to possess a firearm or ammunition on County property” 
violated that right.96 Avoiding the issue of what standard of review to 
apply, the court held that prohibiting firearms on the county fairgrounds 
was constitutional because the “open, public spaces the County’s Ordin-
ance covers fit comfortably within the same category as schools and 
government buildings and that prohibiting firearm possession on munici-
pal property fits within the exception from the Second Amendment for 
‘sensitive places’ that Heller recognized.”97  
Opponents of gun-free zones have often argued that such a regula-
tion is virtually impossible to enforce because of the open, sprawling 
nature of college campuses.98 But when following the reasoning in Nor-
dyke IV, this fact suggests that a college campus would fit within the de-
finition of a “sensitive place” because of its open nature, and therefore, 
any laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms on campus would be pre-
sumptively constitutional. 
More recently, but for a different reason, the Virginia Supreme 
Court held that a public college or university meets the definition of 
“sensitive place” as expressed in Heller.99 Because George Mason Uni-
versity is a school owned by the government, it necessarily falls within 
the definition.100 The court also noted that a significant number of incom-
ing freshman are under the age of eighteen, that thousands of children 
attend summer camp on campus, and that the university hosts various 
family activities including high school graduations, athletic games, and 
concerts.101 For these reasons, the university had a compelling interest in 
                                                 
 95. See Nordyke v. King (Nordyke IV), 563 F.3d 439, 458 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 611 F.3d 
1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (Opinion vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of 
McDonald.). 
 96. Id. at 458. Plaintiffs in this case were gun-show promoters who sued because the statute 
effectively prohibited them from holding gun shows on the county fairgrounds. Id. In the new opi-
nion issued in May 2011, the Ninth Circuit deviated from this reasoning and instead adopted a “sub-
stantial burden” test to determine the standard of review for regulations of firearms. Nordyke v. King 
(Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011). See infra notes 119–22 and 
accompanying text. 
 97. Nordyke IV, 563 F.3d at 460.  
 98. The open nature of college campuses and the difficulty in enforcing gun-free zones is often 
used as an example of how the regulation is not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive manner 
possible and thus would not survive strict scrutiny. See Lindsey Craven, Note, Where do we go from 
Here? Handgun Regulation in a Post-Heller World, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 831, 852 (2010). 
Strict scrutiny is discussed infra in Part III.C. 
 99. See DiGiacinto v. George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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regulating firearms to ensure public safety.102 Moreover, the university 
narrowly tailored its regulation because it did not completely ban wea-
pons on campus but instead prohibited them from being carried inside all 
university buildings and at university events where individuals are most 
vulnerable.103 But even if a court finds that a public college or university 
campus does not fit within the Heller Safe Harbor exception, gun-free 
zones, including total bans, should still withstand judicial review. 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard 
Challenges to state and local gun regulations should be reviewed 
under intermediate scrutiny for three reasons: (1) the Second Amend-
ment protects only a liberty interest, not a fundamental right; (2) even if 
it does protect a fundamental right, fundamental rights do not usually 
trigger judicial review under strict scrutiny; and (3) most judicial deci-
sions thus far have refused to apply strict scrutiny, giving great deference 
to the states’ authority and local expertise. 
In order for a right to be incorporated under the Due Process 
Clause, it must be “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”104 
One could argue that the Second Amendment protects only a liberty in-
terest to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, and therefore, 
the government has more leeway in the regulation of that interest. In the 
due process context, strict scrutiny—the highest standard of judicial re-
view—is appropriate only if the right is deemed fundamental; anything 
less than that would warrant a lesser standard of review.105 
After incorporation, however, some scholars have assumed that the 
Second Amendment is a fundamental right that would trigger strict scru-
tiny.106 But fundamental rights do not always trigger this level of re-
                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. It will be interesting to see how the courts continue to analyze the regulation of fire-
arms in public places. On one hand, Nordyke IV states that the open nature of county fairgrounds 
necessarily classifies the property as a sensitive place, and therefore, the county’s regulation was 
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 104. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 105. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). 
 106. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy, McDonald v. Chicago: 
Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 455 
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ical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1465 (2009). 
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view;107 some are reviewable under intermediate scrutiny or even under a 
rational basis test.108 In fact, strict scrutiny is “actually applied quite rare-
ly in fundamental rights cases.”109 Of the amendments in the Bill of 
Rights that have been incorporated against the states, only two trigger 
strict scrutiny: the First and the Fifth Amendments.110 Moreover, not 
every provision of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed under the highest 
standard—when reviewing alleged violations of the Takings Clause 
courts use a deferential standard.111 In sum, it is a fallacy to assume that 
simply because the Second Amendment is fundamental enough to be 
incorporated against the states, strict scrutiny will necessarily follow. 
Even claims under the First Amendment do not always trigger strict 
scrutiny.112 For example, the freedom of speech doctrine distinguishes 
between content-based and content-neutral regulations, and the latter are 
reviewed under a standard more deferential than strict scrutiny.113 In the 
case of gun-free zones, such a regulation is content-neutral because it 
does not discriminate based on such considerations as race, gender, age, 
or mental health. Rather, the regulation is nondiscriminatory and applies 
to everyone on campus.  
Furthermore, even protected free speech may be restricted by rea-
sonable time, place, and manner regulations.114 For example, most col-
leges and universities regulate when, where, and how individuals may 
exercise their freedom of speech and assembly on campus so as not to 
disrupt the academic learning environment.115 Similarly, in the context of 
                                                 
 107. Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063, at *6 (9th Cir. May 2, 
2011); see also Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 227, 227 (2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992) (joint opinion) 
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 109. Winkler, supra note 107, at 227. 
 110. Id. at 233. 
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 112. Id. at 237. 
 113. Id.; see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. 
Chicago, 26 J.L. & POL. 273, 298 (2011). 
 114. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Cameron 
Desmond, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the 
Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1065 (2008). 
 115. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 580-022-0045(1)(2) (1996) (stating that proscribed conduct 
includes obstruction or disruption of the university’s teaching, research, administration, or other 
public service function and obstruction or disruption that interferes with freedom of movement on 
institutionally owned or controlled property); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 0240-02-03-.02(2)(c)(d) 
(2009) (describing misconduct that is subject to disciplinary sanction as (1) disorderly conduct such 
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the Second Amendment, when a statute prohibits guns on campuses, the 
legislature (or university board) is simply regulating where the right may 
be exercised.116 Accordingly, gun-free zones are analogous to the types 
of time, manner, and place restrictions often imposed on conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment.117 Because the holdings in Heller and 
McDonald protect the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the 
home, designating college campuses as gun-free zones would not be an 
unconstitutional restriction. 
Finally, several cases demonstrate that courts are reluctant to im-
pose the highest level of judicial review on Second Amendment chal-
lenges even though the right has been incorporated against the states. For 
example, one district court has held that the exclusions of the Heller Safe 
Harbor are inconsistent with strict scrutiny, instead operating more like 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.118 Additionally, in 
Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), the Ninth Circuit adopted a substantial 
burden framework similar to the standard used to review the constitutio-
nality of abortion regulations.119 In this case, the court held that “only 
regulations which substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms 
trigger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.”120 Because 
the court did not reach the question of whether the challenged city ordin-
ance was a substantial burden, the court did not define precisely what 
type of heightened scrutiny would be proper.121 Most importantly, at least 
in the context of this Comment, the court stated in dicta that “a regulation 
is particularly unlikely to impose a substantial burden on a constitutional 
                                                                                                             
as behavior that is “abusive, obscene, lewd, indecent, violent, excessively noisy, disorderly, or which 
unreasonably disturbs other groups or individuals,” and (2) any intentional obstruction of or interfe-
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cases, doorways, hallways, or the safe and efficient flow of people and vehicles.”). 
 116. See Desmond, supra note 114, at 1065. 
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 118. United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605–06 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 614 
F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 119. Nordyke v. King (Nordyke V), No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063, at *6 (9th Cir. May 2, 
2011). 
 120. Id. The court found that the gun-show promoters’ Second Amended Complaint did not 
allege sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. But because much of the Supreme Court’s 
Second Amendment jurisprudence was decided after the Complaint was filed, the court vacated the 
district court’s denial of leave to amend with prejudice. Id. at *8. As a result, the Nordykes will have 
the opportunity to show that the city ordinance prohibiting guns from county property substantially 
burdens their Second Amendment rights. 
 121. Id. at *8 n.12. 
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right where it simply declines to use government funds or property to 
facilitate the exercise of that right.”122 
Other courts have avoided the issue altogether. In United States v. 
Skoien, for instance, the government conceded that at least intermediate 
scrutiny was appropriate to challenge a law that prohibited persons con-
victed of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing a firearm.123 
In response, the court stated that “the concession is prudent, and we need 
not get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire, for no one 
doubts that the goal of [the statute], preventing armed mayhem, is an im-
portant governmental objective.”124 
Gun regulations on campus, including total bans, would pass con-
stitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. To survive this standard of 
review, the government must demonstrate that the challenged regulation 
is substantially related to furthering an important government interest.125 
First, most people would not likely argue that a public college or univer-
sity’s interest in ensuring public safety on its campus is not an important 
government objective. Second, the prohibition of firearms—which are 
deadly weapons—is substantially related to furthering the interest of 
public safety on college campuses because, at the very least, the regula-
tion would prevent injuries caused by accidental discharge. Although 
intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of review to eva-
luate firearm regulations, if the courts do begin applying strict scrutiny, 
gun-free zones on college campuses should still be found constitutional. 
C. Gun-Free Zones Should Survive Strict Scrutiny 
When reviewed under strict scrutiny, the “fit” between the govern-
ment interest and the challenged regulation must be much closer than 
required under a lower standard. Under this test, the government bears 
the burden of showing that (a) it possesses a compelling interest; (b) it 
narrowly tailored the regulation to achieve its interest; and (c) no lesser 
restrictive alternative adequately addresses the challenged regulation.126 
First, this section will analyze under strict scrutiny the constitutionality 
of a complete prohibition of guns on campus. I will argue that both pub-
lic safety and academic freedom are compelling government interests, 
which gun-free zones are narrowly tailored to achieve. Second, this sec-
tion will also analyze the constitutionality of regulations that ban guns 
                                                 
 122. Id. at *8. 
 123. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 124. Id. at 642. 
 125. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
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from residence halls, ultimately concluding that such regulations would 
also survive strict scrutiny. 
1. Total Prohibition of Guns on Entire Campuses 
As discussed previously, the Second Amendment has been inter-
preted as a right to keep and bear arms in self-defense of hearth and 
home.127 Therefore, prohibiting guns from college campuses does not 
infringe upon this right. But even if the holdings of Heller and McDo-
nald are extended to self-defense in public places, a regulation prohibit-
ing guns on campuses, and even in residence halls, should survive strict 
scrutiny. 
a. Compelling Government Interest 
The compelling government interest prong of the strict scrutiny test 
will not likely be disputed. Educational institutions have a clear and 
compelling interest to promote the safety and welfare of their students, 
faculty, staff, and visitors while they are on campus.128 Gun prohibitions 
on campus seek to protect individuals from gun-related accidents, sui-
cides, and crime.129 Furthermore, colleges and universities are unique 
public places because they have the additional interest in ensuring aca-
demic freedom and a free exchange of ideas in the classroom. Accor-
dingly, firearm prohibitions also seek to prevent coercion or intimidation 
by the display of guns, which may have an even broader effect on stu-
dents’ ability to learn.130 Thus, the question becomes whether gun-free 
campuses are narrowly tailored and whether there is a less restrictive 
manner in which a college can achieve its interest. 
b. Narrowly Tailored Regulation, Least Restrictive Alternative 
Opponents of gun-free zones on college campuses often argue that 
a total prohibition of firearms is unconstitutionally broad for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) empirical data does not prove that more gun control les-
sens crime; (2) gun-free zones disarm law-abiding citizens and infringe 
on their right to keep and bear arms in self-defense; and (3) concealed- 
                                                 
 127. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see discussion supra Part II.A. 
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2011] The Second Amendment Goes to College 255 
carry permit holders should not have to disarm before entering a public 
college campus. 
First, whether regulations will survive strict scrutiny does depend, 
in part, on providing empirical evidence that more guns will likely lead 
to more crime and that prohibiting guns will likely lessen crime.131 Op-
ponents dispute much of the data about the causal relationship between 
firearm laws and the rate of gun crime. For example, the gun lobby fre-
quently argues that guns are used in self-defense 2.5 million times a year 
and are used five times as often to defend than to perpetrate crimes.132 
But a Harvard study recently found that this claim is based on flawed 
methodology.133 What does not seem to be in dispute, however, is the 
fact that 93% of victimizations of college students take place off-
campus.134 In spite of the sensational stories such as the tragic Virginia 
Tech massacre, statistically, a college campus is one of the safest places 
you can be. For example, in 2002, less than 2% of students reported 
threats involving a gun at school.135 In 2009, of the 13,636 homicides 
reported, (71.8% of which involved firearms),136 only eight occurred on a 
public college or university campus.137 
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was the victim or the initial aggressor. Id.; see also DENNIS A. HENIGAN, LETHAL LOGIC: 
EXPLODING THE MYTHS THAT PARALYZE AMERICAN GUN POLICY 116–21 (2009); David Hemen-
way, The Myth of Millions of Annual Self-Defense Gun Uses: A Case Study of Survey Overestimates 
of Rare Events, 10 CHANCE 6, 6–7 (1997), http://www.isds.duke.edu/~dalene/chance/chanceweb/ 
103.myth0.pdf. 
 134. KATRINA BAUM & PATSY KLAUS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1995–2002 (2005), http://bjs. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf; see also Kopel, supra note 74, at 547. 
 135. Matthew Miller et al., Guns and Gun Threats at College, 51 J. AM. C. HEALTH 57, 63 
(2002), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cas/Documents/Gunthreats2/gunspdf.pdf. 
 136. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2009), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/homicide.html 
(justifiable homicides, i.e., incidents of self-defense, are not included in these figures). 
 137. Id., available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/index.html (Click on Univer-
sities and Colleges link.). 
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Second, although some campus-carry proponents argue that gun-
free zones only “serve to disarm law-abiding citizens who might other-
wise be able to protect themselves,”138 the need to carry guns for self-
defense on a college campus is extremely limited.139 Therefore, prohibit-
ing guns on campuses is a much more narrowly tailored regulation than 
banning handguns in an entire city as was the case in both Heller and 
McDonald. The empirical data shows that a college’s interest in main-
taining the collective security of its campus by prohibiting guns out-
weighs any individual right of self-defense on its premises. 
Third, some proponents for concealed carry on campus argue that a 
regulation prohibiting guns on college campuses is overly broad because 
it prevents citizens who may lawfully carry a firearm in other public 
places from doing so on a public college campus.140 Most states, howev-
er, will not issue permits to individuals under twenty-one years of age, 
and therefore, most students would not be able to carry a concealed wea-
pon anyway.141 Accordingly, the regulation is narrowly tailored because 
it will not affect the majority of individuals on campus who are already 
prohibited from lawfully carrying a concealed weapon.142 
                                                 
 138. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79. 
 139. See BAUM & KLAUS, supra note 134. 
 140. STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79. 
 141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (West 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 
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Second Amendment rights). 
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versity counsel—many of their clients wish to restrict gun possession on their campuses); 
HARNISCH, supra note 66, at 5 (stating that most college administrators and law enforcement per-
sonnel have “expressed serious reservations about allowing concealed weapons on campus”); LISA 
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articles/2011/03/10/20110310arizona-guns-on-campus-bill-scaled-back.html; Jim Vertuno, Texas 
Poised to Pass Bill Allowing Guns on Campus, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 20, 2011 (University of 
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Additionally, because not all concealed-carry permit holders are 
necessarily law-abiding citizens,143 allowing only permit holders to carry 
guns on campus, while certainly less restrictive, is not a reasonable alter-
native because it would not likely achieve a college’s compelling interest 
in public safety. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to ana-
lyze the different methods for issuing concealed-carry permits, most 
states have “shall-issue” laws that require the official to issue the permit 
if the applicant is at least twenty-one years of age, passes a fingerprint-
based background check, and takes a one-hour safety class.144 Proponents 
for campus-carry argue that these safeguards should prevent a college 
from prohibiting permit holders from carrying on campus.145 But statis-
tics show that not all permit holders are responsible, law-abiding citi-
zens: from May 2007 to August 10, 2011, 359 private citizens and eleven 
law enforcement officers have been killed by concealed-carry permit 
holders.146 There have also been nineteen mass shootings and twenty-
seven murder-suicides perpetrated by concealed-carry permit holders.147 
Notably, the Virginia Tech murderer was a lawful gun purchaser who 
passed a federal background check in spite of being adjudicated mentally 
incompetent two years prior to the incident.148 Accordingly, although 
allowing concealed-carry permit holders to carry guns on campus would 
be a narrower regulation than a total prohibition, it is not a reasonable 
alternative that would achieve the public safety that a college has a com-
pelling interest in ensuring. 
Although proponents argue that concealed-carry permit holders 
would be able to thwart tragedies like Virginia Tech if allowed to carry 
                                                                                                             
Texas President William Powers stating his opposition to S.B. 354), http://www.salon.com/ 
news/feature/2011/02/21/texas_allow_guns_on_campus. 
 143. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2011). 
 144. Kopel, supra note 74, at 519–20. A minority of states have “may-issue” laws that allow 
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 145. Id. 
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 148. See Matthew Barakat, Rules Should Have Barred Weapon Purchase, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042000 
167.html; Michael Luo, U.S. Rules Made Killer Ineligible to Purchase Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/21/us/21guns.html. Since the Virginia 
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icle_b8f1d999-1d81-549f-97ff-964cc5f5b6db.html. 
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guns on campus,149 the actual likelihood of criminal deterrence is 
small.150 In fact, possession of a gun seems to promote aggression rather 
than deterrence.151 And with respect to mass shootings, “armed confron-
tation is not a deterrent; it is the point.”152 The notion that a concealed- 
carry permit holder would be able to deter a mentally disturbed individu-
al is extremely unlikely. Even so, one scholar has argued that because 
active shooters generally kill themselves when they know the police have 
arrived, then it follows that “by far the best response to an active shooter 
is for someone to start shooting back.”153 When discussing the mindset of 
a mass shooter, however, the suicide likely occurs to avoid arrest as op-
posed to avoid armed confrontation. In most cases, death is the desired 
                                                 
 149. See generally John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-to-
Carry Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1997); see also Kopel, supra note 74, at 543; STUDENTS 
FOR CONCEALED CARRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 79. 
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assassinate Representative Gabrielle Giffords in a grocery store parking lot. He shot nineteen people 
and killed six. The attack took fifteen seconds. Id. at A1. Although Arizona has some of the most 
lenient gun laws in the nation, no one with a concealed-carry permit was able to prevent the massa-
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 151. Branas et al., supra note 150, at 2036 (estimating that people with a gun were 4.5 times 
more likely to be shot in an assault than those not possessing a gun). 
 152. Josh Horwitz, Guns No Deterrent to the Suicidal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, http://top 
ics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/guns-no-deterrent-to-the-suicidal/?scp=6&sq=&st=nyt. 
 153. Kopel, supra note 74, at 542. But the International Association of Campus Law Enforce-
ment Administrators has argued that persons should not be allowed to carry concealed weapons on 
college campuses, in part, because “there is a real concern that campus police officers responding to 
a situation involving an active shooter may not be able to distinguish between the shooter and others 
with firearms.” SPRAGUE, supra note 142, at 2. For example, at Fort Hood, one of the nation’s larg-
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end, and whether it comes by suicide, the police, or an armed citizen is 
beside the point.154 
Finally, in the rare occurrences that criminal activity can be de-
terred,155 colleges and universities still have an interest in maintaining 
safety on their campuses, which includes regulating conduct that is not 
necessarily criminal.156 For example, binge drinking and drug use are 
prevalent on college campuses;157 adding guns to that mix could have 
dire consequences.158 Allowing guns on campus could result in more ac-
cidental deaths,159 would cause an increased risk of suicide for a demo-
graphic that is already at a greater risk than the rest of the population,160 
and could increase the likelihood of gun theft.161 In addition, even if the 
                                                 
 154. For example, the shooter in the Virginia Tech massacre committed suicide when he rea-
lized the police were closing in. Shapira & Jackman, supra note 78. He also left a suicide note in his 
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State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 780 (Kan. 1993) (holding that the university as a landlord owed a duty of 
reasonable care to its student–tenants); Johnson v. Washington, 894 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Wash. 1995) 
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 158. Miller et al., supra note 135, at 63. 
 159. See David Hemenway et al., Unintentional Firearm Deaths: A Comparison of Other-
Inflicted and Self Inflicted Shootings, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1184 (2010). 
 160. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 67, at 4–5 (stating that access to 
firearms is a significant factor in the risk of suicide); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
SUICIDE FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (2010) (finding that among eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, sui-
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 161. Once stolen, a gun is much more likely to be used in a subsequent crime. BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST 
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guns are never used or even loaded, they can still be used to intimidate, 
to suppress academic discourse, and to create an environment that is not 
conducive to academic debate. Therefore, allowing concealed-carry per-
mit holders to carry guns on campus for the small likelihood of deterring 
criminal activity, though more narrowly tailored than a complete ban, 
would not achieve a college’s purpose in ensuring public safety. In fact, 
it would likely prevent a college from achieving this interest at all. 
c. Academic Freedom 
Colleges and universities also have a compelling government inter-
est in ensuring academic freedom and supporting the free exchange of 
ideas between their students and faculty. Although the effect of guns on 
campus with respect to this interest has not yet been subject to statistical 
or sociological studies, there is evidence that the presence of guns may 
intimidate students from expressing their ideas in the classroom.162 As 
discussed in Part III, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in University of Utah 
v. Shurtleff that the university could not ban guns from its campuses.163 
More specifically, the court held that the university did not have such a 
degree of institutional autonomy that it could act in contravention to leg-
islative enactments.164 While the court found the college’s arguments for 
institutional autonomy persuasive, it was constrained by Utah’s state 
constitution and statutory law.165 The university’s claim of academic 
freedom under the First Amendment was not decided, and the case never 
proceeded in the federal courts. But the chief justice’s dissent in this case 
is informative. She stated that “the record . . . contains extensive evi-
dence that practitioners and experts in higher education are convinced 
that a no weapons on campus policy is necessary to the educational en-
terprise.”166 
Four years after Shurtleff was decided, there have been no reports 
of mass shootings on Utah’s college campuses or in their residence halls. 
Some students and professors, however, have continued to express inti-
midation resulting from the policy. A writer for the university newspaper 
quoted a professor saying that he had seen at least four concealed wea-
pons in his classroom, and it was “unnerving” when the guns were dis-
                                                                                                             
FIREARM TRAFFICKERS 20 (2000), http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/facts/2000-atf-follow 
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 162. See Hemenway & Azrael, supra note 130, at 269. 
 163. Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109, 1121–22 (Utah 2006). 
 164. Id. at 1117. 
 165. Id. at 1121. 
 166. Id. at 1128. 
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played as the students put away class materials.167 Passing out poor 
grades, especially when students often react in a heated manner, made 
the professor feel particularly vulnerable to the weapons policy at the 
University of Utah.168 Two students responded to the article, arguing that 
the weapons were needed for self-defense and that more guns actually 
reduce crime.169 But as noted previously, the claim that firearms are used 
more frequently in self-defense than in criminal acts has been widely 
discredited.170 
Putting the interest of public safety aside, the question becomes 
whether firearms on campus inhibit a college’s compelling interest in 
ensuring academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas, and whether 
a total prohibition is narrowly tailored to meet that objective. As of yet, 
no college or university has filed such a claim in federal court. And al-
though the Utah Supreme Court seemed sympathetic to such an argu-
ment, it was bound by its own state constitution.171 
2. Total Prohibition of Guns in Residence Halls 
While the holdings in Heller and McDonald explicitly protect the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, college dormi-
tories should not fall within the definition of “home.”172 First, residence 
halls are not privately owned or rented residences. Rather, they are 
communal living arrangements that often have shared bathrooms for an 
entire floor, common kitchen areas, and other shared spaces not typically 
found in private residences. Second, because the college, in this capacity, 
acts as a proprietor, it has greater power to restrict and regulate certain 
behavior on its property, including constitutionally protected rights.173 
Assuming, however, that a dormitory does fall under the definition of 
                                                 
 167. Rebecca Rasmussen, Concealed Weapons Threaten Campus Safety, DAILY UTAH 
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“home,” a regulation prohibiting students from possessing guns would 
still likely survive strict scrutiny.  
Many of the same reasons for a total prohibition of guns on cam-
puses carry over to residence halls. Once again, it would be hard to argue 
that a college or university does not have a compelling interest in ensur-
ing and maintaining public safety on its campus. College students, espe-
cially those living together in large groups, are an at-risk group who en-
gage in particularly risky behaviors such as binge drinking and drug 
use.174 They have higher suicide rates than the rest of the population,175 
and 94% of suicide attempts with a firearm are successful.176 If a college 
seeks to protect its students from the dangers of guns, which are exacer-
bated by alcohol and depression, the only way to achieve that interest is 
by prohibiting guns.177 
At least one scholar has argued that “[t]aking away the right to own 
arms in the home purely because the individual chooses to pursue a high-
er education and live on campus is arbitrary and greatly over-
inclusive.”178 But this argument fails because there is no lesser restrictive 
alternative that a college can implement to achieve its interest in prevent-
ing firearm-related crimes and accidents. Based on the statistical evi-
dence presented above, colleges have made a reasonable determination 
that allowing guns in dorm rooms would have potentially deadly results, 
and the only way to achieve a safe and secure environment is to prohibit 
guns. If a state legislature were to pass a statute defining a dorm room as 
a “home,” that may be damaging to a college’s ability to ban guns from 
residence halls.179 Until then, if a student wishes to keep a firearm, that 
right may be executed off-campus. 
Accordingly, a regulation prohibiting guns in residence halls would 
likely be held constitutional under strict scrutiny because a total ban on 
guns is necessary to achieve a college’s interest in protecting vulnerable 
students from either intentional or accidental gun violence. Such a regu-
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lation is also narrowly tailored because students are not required to live 
on-campus.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Although McDonald v. Chicago has incorporated against the states 
an individual right to keep and bear arms in self-defense of hearth and 
home, public colleges and universities should be able to maintain their 
authority to prohibit guns on their campuses and in their residence halls. 
Colleges have a recognized duty in reasonably ensuring a safe environ-
ment for their students, faculty, staff, and visitors. Accordingly, higher-
education institutions should be able to operate autonomously and prom-
ulgate reasonable regulations that will mitigate the harm caused by fire-
arms. 
Most importantly, the top priority of colleges and universities is to 
provide an educational learning environment where academic freedom is 
celebrated and the exchange of ideas may flow freely. In 1957, Justice 
Frankfurter declared, “It is the business of a university to provide that 
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and 
creation.”180 Overwhelmingly, college and university administrators 
agree that guns on campus would compromise the educational enterprise 
necessary for the free exchange of ideas among students and faculty. The 
concept of academic freedom, which has been enshrined within the First 
Amendment, necessarily restricts state legislatures from interfering with 
policy choices made by public colleges and universities. 
 
                                                 
 180. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
